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Abstract 
Local governments in Turkey are based on a tripartite system: special provincial administrations, municipalities, and villages. In 
parallel to the extensive reforms in public administration since 2004, major laws have been changed to decrease the power of 
central government while empowering local governments. As stated in the Emergency Action Plan and the Public Administration 
Basic Law drafts of the newly elected government, (Justice and Development Party, which is still in power in Turkey) 
decentralization for the sake of democratization was one of the top priorities. The reforms were also in line with the European 
Charter of Local Self Government, as well as the dominant new public management paradigm. However, the latest law on 
metropolitan municipalities (Act No 6360) presents a different picture. With this law, the number of the metropolitan 
municipalities increased from 16 to 30, and the authority of the metropolitan municipalities expanded to include the province as a 
whole. The rationale of this expansion is explained as avoiding problems about planning and coordination among too many small 
size local government units, and benefiting economies of scale. As a result, 30 special provincial administrations, 1.591 smaller 
municipalities, and 16.082 villages will be closed. At this point, there emerges a controversial problem: is the local government 
system in Turkey becoming decentralized or is it becoming recentralized? In this paper, we discuss the consequences of 
expansion of the metropolitan municipalities on the basis of subsidiarity principle. We argue that the local government system is 
becoming recentralized around metropolitan cities for the sake of benefiting “scale economies”, and that this centralization 
conflicts with democratic principles on which the local governments are build upon. 
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The tension between “rescaling for economic reasons” and “local democracy” is one of the major issues in 
metropolitan governance [1]. In Europe, this tension was addressed in 1985, with the European Charter of Local Self 
Government. Article 4 of the charter defines the appropriate scale as follows: “Public responsibilities shall generally 
be exercised, in preference, by those authorities who are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another 
authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy”. It is also 
stated that “Powers given to local authorities shall normally be full and exclusive. They may not be undermined or 
limited by another, central or regional, authority except as provided for by the law”. If this definition provided a 
universally recognized criterion, there would have been less confusion about the “optimal scale” which would 
balance economic and democratic necessities. However, this is not the case. Each country in different regions of the 
world has developed administrative designs in their own context [2] [3]. Although the consequences may be 
different, one can still identify two main streams which were more or less commonly experienced on a global scale 
in the last two decades: 1) expansion of the metropolitan areas; and 2) introduction of new public management 
measures to confront fiscal and democratic challenges[3]. These two streams have also been experienced in Turkey. 
With the latest law about metropolitan municipalities (Act no. 6360), almost 50 percent of the country’s total area, 
and almost 73 percent of the total population will be living in metropolitan municipalities in 2014. This 
unprecedented rescaling of metropolitans has revitalized the problem of the “optimal scale” in Turkish local 
government system.  
In this paper we discuss the latest expansion of metropolitan municipalities on the basis of subsidiarity principle. 
We argue that the local government system is becoming recentralized around metropolitan cities for the sake of 
benefiting “scale economies”, and that this centralization conflicts with democratic principles on which the local 
governments are build upon. The remaining of the paper is organized in three sections. In the second section we 
summarize the expansion of the metropolitan municipalities. We also provide the main arguments in favour of 
rescaling as stated in the preambles of Act No 5216 and Act No 6360. In the third section, we discuss the 
recentralization on metropolitan scale and argue that democratic subsidiarity principle has been eroded in favour of 
economic rescaling. In the final section we conclude our discussion and make recommendations about further 
studies.  
 
2. Expansion of Metropolitan Municipalities 
 
The first metropolitan municipalities (Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir) in Turkey were established in 1984. Since then, 
both the number and the responsibility areas of the metropolitan municipalities has gradually increased. After 
extensive local government reforms since 2004, new public management measures such as decentralization, 
privatization, public/private partnerships, and development of tighter financial control mechanism have 
accompanied spatial expansion. During 1980s and 1990s, the debate about the optimal balance between scaling and 
local democracy was coupled with a debate about the extensive tutelage powers of central government over local 
governments in Turkey. In parallel to the extensive reforms in public administration since 2004, major local 
government laws have been changed to decrease the power of central government while empowering local 
governments. As stated in the Emergency Action Plan and the Public Administration Basic Law drafts of the newly 
elected government, (Justice and Development Party, which is still in power in Turkey) decentralization for the sake 
of democratization was one of the top priorities. The reforms were also in line with the European Charter of Local 
Self Government, as well as the dominant new public management paradigm [4]. Decentralization was also 
accompanied with two waves of expansion of the metropolitan municipalities. First wave was in 2004, when the 
responsibility area of the metropolitans was increased according to their populations with the Metropolitan 
Municipalities Law (Act No. 5216). The second, and bigger, wave was in 2012 with the legislation (Act no 6360) 
which established 14 more metropolitan municipalities, and expanded the metropolitan municipality borders to 
provincial borders. As a result of this law, the metropolitan population will increase from 47% to 73% of the 
national population, and the metropolitan municipality areas will increase from 30% to 50% of the country’s total 
area in 2014, when the articles related to expansion will be effective after the local elections (see, Appendix-1). 
The preambles of Act no. 5216 and Act No. 6360 explain the main reasons (among others) of rescaling as 
avoiding problems about planning and coordination among too many units, benefiting economies of scale, 
inadequate capacity and financial weakness of small size municipalities, inefficient and unproductive administration, 
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lack of qualified workers in small units, etc. It is argued that large scale local governments may provide quality 
public services, and may bring about fair distribution of resources. The right scale of the metropolitan municipalities 
is also provided in the preamble of Act No 5216 with reference to the subsidiarity principle. The scale for 
establishing a metropolitan municipality is based on population criterion which should be at least one million (This 
population size was rolled back to 750 thousand in the final text of the law). As stated in the preamble, sub-level or 
district municipalities within the metropolitan municipality should provide local common services which do not 
have effects outside their own borders, while the metropolitan municipality should provide services that require 
metropolitan planning and coordination or require metropolitan municipality due to financial reasons. The services 
which could be provided by the sub-level municipalities but which could also cause conflicts in practice will be 
provided by the metropolitan municipality. It is claimed that this distribution of functions will not only guarantee 
objectivity in practice but also realize the principle of subsidiarity. The preamble of Act No 6360 is clearer about the 
ideal, optimal, and bigger scale. In order to provide efficient, productive, and quality public service, the 
metropolitan municipality should cover the whole province.  
 
3. Democratic Subsidiarity versus Recentralization 
 
In 2014, 30 special provincial administrations, 1.591 smaller municipalities, and 16.082 villages will be dissolved 
as a result of the expansion of the 30 metropolitan municipalities to provincial borders. In these provinces, dissolved 
municipalities and villages will become neighborhoods (mahalle), an administrative unit which has no legal entity. 
Moreover, all the existing district municipalities in the province will become metropolitan district municipalities.  
Dissolution of village administrations and sub-district municipalities has been criticized in numerous studies. For 
example Gozler [5] states that this is a clear violation of the subsidiarity principle. He claims this will lead to 
eradication of regional and local diversity, removal of decision making to distant municipalities, and inconsistencies 
due to different needs of urban and rural populations. On the other hand, Guler [6] argues that the residents of the 
dissolved administrative units have not been counseled, informed, or asked whether they wanted to be a part of 
another municipality. However, the Constitutional Court ruled in September 2013 that the legislation was not 
inconsistent with the Constitution. An earlier decision of the court about the dissolution of small local government 
(sub-district municipalities and villages) units in order to provide more efficient and productive public services also 
stated that dissolving local governments due to economic scaling was not a violation of the local people’s wills. So, 
as far as the Constitutional Court decisions are concerned, the expansion of metropolitan municipalities for 
economic re-scaling does not contradict with the subsidiarity principle.  
We argue here that the expansion embeds significant degree of recentralization, and the locus of this 
recentralization is the metropolitan municipality. When the borders of the metropolitan municipality expand, its 
powers also expand. We can outline the main powers of metropolitan municipalities as listed below: 
• Determining strategic plan priorities, 
• Allocation of resources within the metropolitan municipality, 
• Selective financial support to metropolitan district municipalities, 
• Authority in disputes among metropolitan district municipalities, 
• Extensive authority in planning  
The power of the metropolitans is also reinforced by dissolution of special provincial administrations. The 
metropolitan municipality assembly becomes the only province-wide elected assembly after the dissolution of the 
provincial general assembly of the special provincial administrations. Thus it becomes the only channel to seek 
support for the sub-level municipalities. Moreover, the municipality model in Turkey is based on a “strong 
mayor/weak assembly” approach. With the latest legislation, the metropolitan mayor becomes the only province-
wide directly elected representative. So, it could be claimed that the power will be concentrated in the hands of 
metropolitan mayors. Although we focus on recentralization on metropolitan level, it is also possible to claim that 
the central government becomes more powerful, too. Sectorial recentralization, Investment Monitoring and 
Coordination Office, Regional Development Agencies, and the political relationships between the mayors and the 
central government add to further weakening of district municipalities [7] [8].  
 
4. Conclusion and Recommendations 
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So, what does a stronger province-wide metropolitan municipality and stronger central government units mean in 
terms of subsidiarity? We can safely suggest that the decision making has been removed to distant assemblies. One 
can also identify a reversal of the decentralizing reforms of the early 2000s. It seems the big problems of the 
metropolitans are tried to be solved by making them bigger. However, this also makes the smaller local government 
units much weaker. Dissolution of local government units with laws, or decrees without listening to locals’ demands 
may be considered as opposing subsidiarity. It is also problematic to dissolve legal entities, and cultures of villages 
which are the only local government units that exercise direct democracy as well as sub-district municipalities that 
are the main school of democracy for people living in smaller settlements. Whether the provincial border is the 
optimal scale for metropolitan municipalities is yet to be seen. If the expanded metropolitan municipalities can 
provide better public services with lower costs to citizens who reside both in urban and rural areas while still 
nurturing local democracy, then its optimality will be approved. However, until that future, there is need to discuss 
the consequences of rescaling metropolitans in order to identify inclinations which may deteriorate the democratic 
gains of the decentralizing local government reforms which were brought about by the same government a decade 
ago after great struggles. Here we presented the expansion of metropolitan municipalities, and argued that the 
powers of the metropolitan municipalities have significantly increased. Even if the optimal scales have been 
established for service delivery, there seem to be vital problems about local democracy. Further studies must closely 
monitor the consequences of the expansion in terms of service delivery and local participation.  
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Appendix A. Expansion of Metropolitan Municipalities 
 
Metropolitan 
Municipality 
Date/Act no Metropolitan 
population 
2012 
Provincial 
population 
2012 
Area 
(km2) 
Act No. 5216 
 (2004) 
Act No 6360 
(2012) 
20 
km 
30 
km 
50 km Whole 
province 
Whole 
province 
Ankara 1984/3030 4.630.735 4.965.542 25.706   *  * 
Istanbul 1984/3030 13.710.512 13.854.740 5.220    * * 
Izmir 1984/3030 3.401.994 4.005.459 11.973   *  * 
Adana 1986/3306 1.636.229 2.125.635 14.030  *   * 
Bursa 1987/3391 1.983.880 2.688.171 11.043  *   * 
Gaziantep 1987/3398 1.438.373 1.799.558 6.554 *    * 
Konya 1987/3399 1.107.886 2.052.281 38.257 *    * 
Kayseri 1988/3508 1.004.276 1 274 968 16.917 *    * 
Antalya 1993/504 (decree) 1.073.794 2.092.537 20.591 *    * 
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Diyarbakır 1993/504 (decree) 892.713 1.592.167 15.355 *    * 
Erzurum 1993/504 (decree) 384.399 778.195 25.066 *    * 
Eskisehir 1993/504 (decree) 659.924 789.750 13.652 *    * 
Kocaeli 1993/504 (decree) 1.527.407 1.634.691 3.505    * * 
Mersin 1993/504 (decree) 876.958 1.682.848 15.853 *    * 
Samsun 1993/504 (decree) 547.778 1.251.722 9.579 *    * 
Sakarya 2000/593 (decree) 590.498 902.267 4.817 *    * 
Aydin 2014/6360  1.006.541 8.007     * 
Balikkesir 2014/6360  1.160.731 14.292     * 
Denizli 2014/6360  950.557 11.868     * 
Hatay 2014/6360  1 483674 5.403     * 
Malatya 2014/6360  762.366 12.313     * 
Manisa 2014/6360  1.346.162 13.810     * 
Kahramanmaras 2014/6360  1.063.174 14.327     * 
Mardin 2014/6360  773.026 8.891     * 
Mugla 2014/6360  851.145 13.338     * 
Tekirdag 2014/6360  852.321 6.218     * 
Trabzon 2014/6360  757.898 4.685     * 
Sanliurfa 2014/6360  1.762.075 18.584     * 
Van 2014/6360  1.051.975 19.069     * 
Ordu 2014/6360  741.371 6.001     * 
30 Metropolitan 
Municipalities 
 Total 
35.467.356 
Total 
55.294.905 
 
Total 
394.924 
In 2014, metropolitan population increases from 47% to 
73% of the population; metropolitan areas increase from 
30% to 50% of the country’s total area. 
Source [9] [10] 
 
